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University endowments hard hit by market turmoil
WSJ reports:
Harvard University's endowment suffered investment losses of at least 22% in the first four months of the school's fiscal year, the latest evidence of the financial woes facing higher education.
The Harvard endowment, the biggest of any university, stood at $36.9 billion as of June 30, meaning the loss amounts to about $8 billion. That's more than the entire endowments of all but six colleges, according to the latest official tally.
Harvard said the actual loss could be even higher, once it factors in declines in hard-to-value assets such as real estate and private equity — investments that have become increasingly popular among colleges. The university is planning for a 30% decline for the fiscal year ending in June 2009.
Other university endowments also are suffering, and many states are cutting public funding of higher education. Colleges are instituting hiring freezes, planning enrollment cuts and discussing steep tuition increases, intensifying worries about the impact of the recession and financial crisis on college access.
The federal government already has taken emergency steps to boost lending to students, and several well-off colleges have said they will maintain or boost financial aid to help families hurt by job losses, investments setbacks and borrowing problems. But not all colleges have the financial heft to withstand the many forces bearing down on them.
Joni Finney, a professor at the University of Pennsylvania who studies college economics, says she worries that public universities and less-wealthy, smaller private colleges may not be able to keep their doors open to all students. "If you go down the food chain of higher education, it's harder and harder to deal with these kinds of cuts," she says.
Private-college budgets are sensitive to investment declines because they typically tap their endowments each year to help cover operating expenses.
The University of Virginia Investment Management Co. said it lost nearly $1 billion, or 18%, of its endowment over the four-month period, reducing it to $4.2 billion. In Vermont, Middlebury College says its endowment fell 14.4%, to $724 million. In Iowa, Grinnell College's endowment dropped 25%, to $1.2 billion. In Massachusetts, Amherst College says its endowment, $1.7 billion as of June 30, also fell by 25%.
In a letter to Harvard's deans, university President Drew Gilpin Faust and another official blamed "severe turmoil in the world's financial markets" for the endowment loss. She said it would lead to budget cuts, and that the school would sell bonds to increase its financial flexibility.
The Harvard letter said the 22% loss, from July 1 through Oct. 31, understates the actual decline because it doesn't reflect assets such as real estate whose values couldn't yet be estimated. Currently, endowment income funds 35% of Harvard's $3.5 billion budget.
The 30% fiscal-year loss Harvard is planning for would eclipse the loss of 12.2% in 1974, its worst over the last 40 years.
Harvard's loss marks a sharp reversal from the endowment's formerly chart-topping performance. Harvard and Yale University — which hasn't disclosed its endowment's recent performance — pioneered an investment approach that de-emphasized U.S. stocks and bonds and placed large sums in more exotic and illiquid investments, including timberland, real estate and private-equity funds. That strategy, which was widely copied, helped the schools avoid significant losses after the technology boom ended in 2000.
But the current market has been far less favorable, partly because both Harvard and Yale have relatively small holdings of bonds, such as U.S. Treasurys, one of the few assets that have performed well. Harvard began its fiscal year with a target of having 33% invested in publicly traded shares, split among U.S. stocks, which have dropped 24% in the four months through October, and international stocks, which have fared worse.
Other investments, such as commodities, which were a boon to Harvard in past years, have turned negative in recent weeks. Harvard has sought to sell off about $1.5 billion in investments with private-equity firms, which typically use their assets to fund corporate takeovers, according to people familiar with the situation. That would be one of the largest sales ever of a private-equity stake. But its private-equity partnerships received bids of only around 50 cents on the dollar, say other people familiar with the matter.
Daniel Jick, chief executive officer at Boston-based HighVista Strategies, which handles money for some endowments, says that in some prior years, investments such as real estate and private equity have helped buffer endowments against losses on stocks.
In her letter, Harvard's Dr. Faust said the endowment loss has "major implications for our budgets and planning, especially since our other principal revenue streams also stand to be challenged by the economic crisis." Along with federal research funding, universities rely heavily on tuition and donations. Strained family finances could make it difficult for more families to afford tuition, while stock-market declines typically curb gifts.
To maintain its programs and commitments, the letter said, Harvard is expecting to spend a higher percentage of its endowment than it had recently. It said it was taking a "hard look at hiring, staffing levels and compensation," and was "reconsidering the scale and pace of planned capital projects."
Hart: Economists Have Abandoned Principle
Oliver Hart, one of the most prominent economists in micro theory, with Zingales at University of Chicago, says economists have abandoned their principle and government lacks a coherent strategy in their dealing with the crisis. So what's the alternative to the problem of "too big to fail"?
This year will be remembered not just for one of the worst financial crises in American history, but also as the moment when economists abandoned their principles. There used to be a consensus that selective intervention in the economy was bad. In the last 12 months this belief has been shattered.
Practically every day the government launches a massively expensive new initiative to solve the problems that the last day's initiative did not. It is hard to discern any principles behind these actions. The lack of a coherent strategy has increased uncertainty and undermined the public's perception of the government's competence and trustworthiness.
The Obama administration, with its highly able team of economists, has a golden opportunity to put the country on a better path. We believe that the way forward is for the government to adopt two key principles. The first is that it should intervene only when there is a clearly identified market failure. The second is that government intervention should be carried out at minimum cost to taxpayers.
How do these principles apply to the present crisis? First, the market economy provides mechanisms for dealing with difficult times. Take bankruptcy. It is often viewed as a kind of death, but this is misleading. Bankruptcy is an opportunity for a company (or individual) to make a fresh start. A company in financial distress faces the danger that creditors will try to seize its assets. Bankruptcy gives it some respite. It also provides an opportunity for claimants to figure out whether the company's financial trouble was the result of bad luck or bad management, and to decide what should be done. Short-cutting this process through a government bailout is dangerous. Does the government really know whether a company should be saved?
As an example of an effective bankruptcy mechanism, one need look no further than the FDIC procedure for banks. When a bank gets into trouble the FDIC puts it into receivership and tries to find a buyer. Every time this procedure has been invoked the depositors were paid in full and had access to their money at all times. The system works well.
From this perspective, one must ask what would have been so bad about letting Bear Stearns, AIG and Citigroup (and in the future, General Motors) go into receivership or Chapter 11 bankruptcy? One argument often made is that these institutions had huge numbers of complicated claims, and that the bankruptcy of any one of them would have led to contagion and systemic failure, causing scores of further bankruptcies. AIG had to be saved, the argument goes, because it had trillions of dollars of credit default swaps with J.P. Morgan. These credit default swaps acted as hedges for trillions of dollars of credit default swaps that J.P. Morgan had with other parties. If AIG had gone bankrupt, J.P. Morgan would have found itself unhedged, putting its stability and that of others at risk.
This argument has some validity, but it suggests that the best way to proceed is to help third parties rather than the distressed company itself. In other words, instead of bailing out AIG and its creditors, it would have been better for the government to guarantee AIG's obligations to J.P. Morgan and those who bought insurance from AIG. Such an action would have nipped the contagion in the bud, probably at much smaller cost to taxpayers than the cost of bailing out the whole of AIG. It would also have saved the government from having to take a position on AIG's viability as a business, which could have been left to a bankruptcy court. Finally, it would have minimized concerns about moral hazard. AIG may be responsible for its financial problems, but the culpability of those who do business with AIG is less clear, and so helping them out does not reward bad behavior.
Similar principles apply to the housing market. It appears that many people thought that house prices would never fall nationally, and made financial decisions based on this premise. The adjustment to the new reality is painful. But past mistakes do not constitute a market failure. Thus it makes no sense for the government to support house prices, as some economists have suggested.
Where there is arguably a market failure is in mortgage renegotiations. Many mortgages are securitized, and the lenders are dispersed and cannot easily alter the terms of the mortgage. It is unlikely that the present situation was anticipated when the loan contracts were written. Government initiatives at facilitating renegotiation therefore make a lot of sense.
Our desire for a principled approach to this crisis does not arise from an academic need for intellectual coherence. Without principles, policy makers inevitably make mistakes and succumb to lobbying pressure. This is what happened with the Bush administration. The Obama administration can do better.
Mr. Hart is a professor of economics at Harvard. Mr. Zingales is a professor of finance at the Chicago Booth School of Business.
How about a payroll tax cut?
Greg Mankiw interview on policy alternatives:
(source: CNBC, click to play)
Krugman on government spending in crisis
Paul Krugman on NBER’s recession call and his assessment on the current state of the economy (source: CNBC)
Also, in reply to the criticism that big government spending will increase budget deficits and crowd out private investment, he elaborates his views on NY Times of why big government spending is needed now, budget deficits shouldn’t be the main worry, and government spending won’t crowd out private investment.
Deficits and the Future
Right now there’s intense debate about how aggressive the United States government should be in its attempts to turn the economy around. Many economists, myself included, are calling for a very large fiscal expansion to keep the economy from going into free fall. Others, however, worry about the burden that large budget deficits will place on future generations.
But the deficit worriers have it all wrong. Under current conditions, there’s no trade-off between what’s good in the short run and what’s good for the long run; strong fiscal expansion would actually enhance the economy’s long-run prospects.
The claim that budget deficits make the economy poorer in the long run is based on the belief that government borrowing “crowds out” private investment — that the government, by issuing lots of debt, drives up interest rates, which makes businesses unwilling to spend on new plant and equipment, and that this in turn reduces the economy’s long-run rate of growth. Under normal circumstances there’s a lot to this argument.
But circumstances right now are anything but normal. Consider what would happen next year if the Obama administration gave in to the deficit hawks and scaled back its fiscal plans.
Would this lead to lower interest rates? It certainly wouldn’t lead to a reduction in short-term interest rates, which are more or less controlled by the Federal Reserve. The Fed is already keeping those rates as low as it can — virtually at zero — and won’t change that policy unless it sees signs that the economy is threatening to overheat. And that doesn’t seem like a realistic prospect any time soon.
What about longer-term rates? These rates, which are already at a half-century low, mainly reflect expected future short-term rates. Fiscal austerity could push them even lower — but only by creating expectations that the economy would remain deeply depressed for a long time, which would reduce, not increase, private investment.
The idea that tight fiscal policy when the economy is depressed actually reduces private investment isn’t just a hypothetical argument: it’s exactly what happened in two important episodes in history.
The first took place in 1937, when Franklin Roosevelt mistakenly heeded the advice of his own era’s deficit worriers. He sharply reduced government spending, among other things cutting the Works Progress Administration in half, and also raised taxes. The result was a severe recession, and a steep fall in private investment.
The second episode took place 60 years later, in Japan. In 1996-97 the Japanese government tried to balance its budget, cutting spending and raising taxes. And again the recession that followed led to a steep fall in private investment.
Just to be clear, I’m not arguing that trying to reduce the budget deficit is always bad for private investment. You can make a reasonable case that Bill Clinton’s fiscal restraint in the 1990s helped fuel the great U.S. investment boom of that decade, which in turn helped cause a resurgence in productivity growth.
What made fiscal austerity such a bad idea both in Roosevelt’s America and in 1990s Japan were special circumstances: in both cases the government pulled back in the face of a liquidity trap, a situation in which the monetary authority had cut interest rates as far as it could, yet the economy was still operating far below capacity.
And we’re in the same kind of trap today — which is why deficit worries are misplaced.
One more thing: Fiscal expansion will be even better for America’s future if a large part of the expansion takes the form of public investment — of building roads, repairing bridges and developing new technologies, all of which make the nation richer in the long run.
Should the government have a permanent policy of running large budget deficits? Of course not. Although public debt isn’t as bad a thing as many people believe — it’s basically money we owe to ourselves — in the long run the government, like private individuals, has to match its spending to its income.
But right now we have a fundamental shortfall in private spending: consumers are rediscovering the virtues of saving at the same moment that businesses, burned by past excesses and hamstrung by the troubles of the financial system, are cutting back on investment. That gap will eventually close, but until it does, government spending must take up the slack. Otherwise, private investment, and the economy as a whole, will plunge even more.
The bottom line, then, is that people who think that fiscal expansion today is bad for future generations have got it exactly wrong. The best course of action, both for today’s workers and for their children, is to do whatever it takes to get this economy on the road to recovery.
Meredith Whitney on restoring consumer liquidity
Whitney’s interview today on CNBC:
(click to play)
And her op-ed piece on FT, “America must keep consumer liquidity flowing“.
As an analyst, it is my job to do fundamental research and call it as I see it, and my bailiwick is financials. My outlook has been negative for over a year and, technically, I have been “right” on my calls. Seeing massive capital destruction has brought me no pleasure, but unfortunately I see little on the horizon that would change my outlook. In fact, after observing the US economy so derailed, I feel that I must act as a citizen of this great country to attempt to offer solutions to this economic train wreck we are all involved in.
First, I am more bearish today than I have been in the past 18 months. In so far as the market has impacted on the economy, capital destruction has been so intense that multi-trillions in capital raised by institutions through both private and public capital has gone to plug holes and not stabilise the effects of shrinking liquidity to corporations and consumers. More than $3,000bn (€2,365bn, £1,955bn) of available credit has been expunged from the markets and therefore corporate and consumer borrowers so far this year.
I estimate that the mortgage market will shrink for the first time in US history and that the credit card market will be 18 months behind it. While just over 70 per cent of US households have access to credit cards, 90 per cent of these people use credit cards as a cash-flow management vehicle, or revolve payments at least once a year. While the credit card market is small relative to the mortgage market, it has grown to play a key role in consumer liquidity. Declining liquidity here will have disastrous effects on consumer spending and the economy. My primary concern is preserving liquidity to consumers, who command more than two-thirds of gross domestic product.
There is no doubt that time will be the greatest healer, but there is a strong argument for putting the financial system through a methadone-clinic-style rehabilitation as opposed to the “cold sweats” rehab that we face. The US government appears to feel the same, which is why various versions of direct government lending and quasi- as well as real bail-outs have been announced. Certainly, credit was extended to unworthy borrowers, but the baby is now being thrown out with the bath water. I expect more broad-based credit contractions but, specifically, more than $2,000bn in credit lines to be cut in reaction to risk aversion, constrained capital and regulatory change.
Here are some easily adoptable changes that would make a difference.
First, re-regionalise lending. Since the early 1990s, key bank products, mortgages and credit card lending were rapidly consolidated nationally. Banking went from “knowing your customer” or local lending, to relying on what have proven to be unreliable FICO credit scores and centralised underwriting. The government should now motivate local lenders (many of which have clean balance sheets) to re-widen their product offering to include credit cards and encourage the mega banks to provide servicing and processing facilities to banks that sold off these capabilities years ago.
Second, expand the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s guarantee for bank debt. Banks need to know they can access reasonably priced credit for an extended period to continue to extend new credit lines. Any semi-conscious bank management team knows that capital and liquidity are precious and therefore is hoarding both.
Third, delay the introduction of accounting rule FAS 140 until 2011 or 2012. These moves to bring off-balance-sheet assets back on balance sheet for the sake of transparency are a mirage. The primary assets that will come back on to balance sheets are credit card loans. Frankly, there is more transparency in off-balance-sheet master trust data than in on-balance-sheet accrual accounting. Banks cannot afford it now and it will further constrain credit.
Fourth, amend the proposal on Unfair and Deceptive Lending Practices that is set to be adopted in 2010. The proposal includes one major change that will lead to a severe unintended consequence – pulling credit from consumers. Restricting lenders’ ability to reprice an unsecured loan will cause them to stop lending or to lend less. This change could cut over $2,000bn in unused credit card lines, or over 40 per cent of unused credit lines. With so many Americans relying on their credit cards as a major source of liquidity, it would be equivalent to a major pay cut.
This is no time for partisanship. The situation is too dire. These changes are ones I would never have imagined endorsing a year ago, but these are extraordinary times.
The writer is managing director of Oppenheimer & Co.
China reverses currency appreciation
Facing sharp fall of its export in coming quarters, Chinese government seems to reverse its course of letting Yuan appreciate against the US dollar (source: FT).
The renminbi posted a record one-day fall against the dollar on Monday as speculation mounted that the Chinese authorities might use a weaker currency to spur economic growth.
The speculation was triggered after the People’s Bank of China set an unexpectedly high central parity in the dollar/renminbi rate.
The central bank manages the currency around its central parity rate, allowing it to fluctuate by 0.5 per cent on any one day.
After closing on Friday at Rmb6.8349, the central bank set the parity rate up sharply at Rmb6.8505.
As dealing started yesterday, traders pushed the renminbi to the limit of its trading band for only the second time. The renminbi closed the session at Rmb6.8842, down 0.9 per cent from Friday’s close.
This was the renminbi’s largest one-day fall against the dollar since it was de-pegged from the US currency in July 2005, and took the currency to its weakest level since June 17.
After pressure from the US, which argued that China’s cheap currency was giving its exports an unfair advantage, China let the renminbi appreciate by 20 per cent in the three years following July 2005.
However, the renminbi has remained stable against the dollar since July this year, raising speculation that the gradual appreciation of the Chinese currency might be coming to an end.
Analysts said comments from Hu Jintao, China’s president, over the weekend had helped raise the prospect that China was moving towards a new foreign- exchange policy as the global slowdown deepened.
President Hu, speaking about the difficulties facing the economy and government, warned that Chinese competitiveness could be undermined by the current economic downturn. He also said domestic and global economic weakness could test the grip of the ruling Communist party.
“This is clearly a reference to the fact that weak growth is likely to lead to significant social unrest,” said Steve Barrow at Standard Bank.
The renminbi also weakened in the offshore forwards market.
Higher education as global commodity: the other way around
While Chinese and Indians are flooding into much more expensive American universities, more Americans are going to universities overseas for their cheaper tuition. Not only for a study-abroad semester, but for the entire degree. One of their favorite destinations: Scotland. (source: NYT)
NBER makes it official: recession started December 2007
Official recession watchers at the NBER said today that the U.S. is recession, and it began in December 2007. Here is the text of their statement.
The Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau of Economic Research met by conference call on Friday, November 28. The committee maintains a chronology of the beginning and ending dates (months and quarters) of U.S. recessions. The committee determined that a peak in economic activity occurred in the U.S. economy in December 2007. The peak marks the end of the expansion that began in November 2001 and the beginning of a recession. The expansion lasted 73 months; the previous expansion of the 1990s lasted 120 months.
A recession is a significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a few months, normally visible in production, employment, real income, and other indicators. A recession begins when the economy reaches a peak of activity and ends when the economy reaches its trough. Between trough and peak, the economy is in an expansion.