China’s current account surplus is dramatically shrinking.

Robert Barro, economist at Harvard, deciphers the history and answers the question whether government stimulus spending really work as claimed.

However, Barro did not mention the potential benefits of using government stimulas spening to reverse the “vicious cycle” during the time of panic.

(source: WSJ)

The global recession and financial crisis have refocused attention on government stimulus packages. These packages typically emphasize spending, predicated on the view that the expenditure “multipliers” are greater than one—so that gross domestic product expands by more than government spending itself. Stimulus packages typically also feature tax reductions, designed partly to boost consumer demand (by raising disposable income) and partly to stimulate work effort, production and investment (by lowering rates).

The existing empirical evidence on the response of real gross domestic product to added government spending and tax changes is thin. In ongoing research, we use long-term U.S. macroeconomic data to contribute to the evidence. The results mostly favor tax rate reductions over increases in government spending as a means to increase GDP.

For defense spending, the principal long-run variations reflect the buildups and aftermaths of major wars—World War I, World War II, the Korean War and, to a much lesser extent, the Vietnam War. World War II tends to dominate, with the ratio of added defense spending to GDP reaching 26% in 1942 and 17% in 1943, and then falling to -26% in 1946.

Wartime spending is helpful for estimating spending multipliers for three key reasons. First, the variations in spending are large and include positive and negative values. Second, since the main changes in military spending are independent of economic developments, it is straightforward to isolate the direction of causation between government spending and GDP. Third, unlike many other countries during the world wars, the U.S. suffered only moderate loss of life and did not experience massive destruction of physical capital. In addition, because the unemployment rate in 1940 exceeded 9% but then fell to 1% in 1944, there is some information on how the multiplier depends on the strength of the economy.

For annual data that start in 1939 or earlier (and, thereby, include World War II), the defense-spending multiplier that applies at the average unemployment rate of 5.6% is in a range of 0.6-0.7. A multiplier less than one means that, overall, other components of GDP fell when defense spending rose. Empirically, our research shows that most of the fall was in private investment, with personal consumer expenditure changing little.

Our research also shows that greater weakness in the economy raises the estimated multiplier: It increases by around 0.1 for each two percentage points by which the unemployment rate exceeds its long-run median of 5.6%. Thus the estimated multiplier reaches 1.0 when the unemployment rate gets to about 12%.

To evaluate typical fiscal-stimulus packages, however, nondefense government spending multipliers are more important. Estimating these multipliers convincingly from U.S. time series is problematical, however, because the movements in nondefense government purchases (dominated since the 1960s by state and local outlays) are closely intertwined with the business cycle. Thus the explanation for much of the positive association between nondefense spending and GDP is that government spending increased in response to growing GDP, rather than the reverse.

The effects of tax rates on GDP growth can be analyzed from a time series we’ve constructed on average marginal income-tax rates from federal and state income taxes and the Social Security payroll tax. Since 1950, the largest declines in the average marginal rate from the federal individual income tax occurred under Ronald Reagan (to 21.8% in 1988 from 25.9% in 1986 and to 25.6% in 1983 from 29.4% in 1981), George W. Bush (to 21.1% in 2003 from 24.7% in 2000), and Kennedy-Johnson (to 21.2% in 1965 from 24.7% in 1963). Tax rates rose particularly during the Korean War, the 1970s and the 1990s. The average marginal tax rate from Social Security (including payments from employees, employers and the self-employed) expanded to 10.8% in 1991 from 2.2% in 1971 and then remained reasonably stable.

For data that start in 1950, we estimate that a one-percentage-point cut in the average marginal tax rate raises the following year’s GDP growth rate by around 0.6% per year. However, this effect is harder to pin down over longer periods that include the world wars and the Great Depression.

It would be useful to apply our U.S. analysis to long-term macroeconomic time series for other countries, but many of them experienced massive contractions of real GDP during the world wars, driven by the destruction of capital stocks and institutions and large losses of life. It is also unclear whether other countries have the necessary underlying information to construct measures of average marginal income-tax rates—the key variable for our analysis of tax effects in the U.S. data.

The bottom line is this: The available empirical evidence does not support the idea that spending multipliers typically exceed one, and thus spending stimulus programs will likely raise GDP by less than the increase in government spending. Defense-spending multipliers exceeding one likely apply only at very high unemployment rates, and nondefense multipliers are probably smaller. However, there is empirical support for the proposition that tax rate reductions will increase real GDP.

Every month when we have a uptick on housing price index, there will be a discussion on whether housing price will recover soon.

Following my last update in August, here is another update from two housing experts on recent housing trends.

First, David Levy on housing:

Then, the interview of Robert Shiller on longer-term housing trends.

Q&A: Shiller Sees 5 Years of Stagnant Home Prices

Robert Shiller, the Yale University economist who famously predicted the housing bust, was awarded the Deutsche Bank Prize in Financial Economics today. In this interview, he talks about the state of the housing market and the implications of low interest rates.
Robert Shiller is awarded Deutsche Bank Prize in Financial Economics 2009. (Center for Financial Studies)

Is the slump in U.S. home prices bottoming out?

Shiller: The situation has definitely changed. With our numbers — the S&P/Case Shiller home price index — going up sharply. It looks like a major turnaround. We’ve been watching that for three months now, and we have some concern that it could be an aberration and temporary. But, at this point, it seems to be evident in just about every city in the U.S. That suggests it’s real. But it probably isn’t the beginning of a major boom, just because the economy is in such bad shape. There’s also a chance that it will reverse. It’s still only three months old, so it’s very hard to be sure at this point. The most likely scenario is that it won’t continue at this high rate of increase, but that it will neither go down a lot, nor up a lot.

So the index will move sideways for a while?

Shiller: Yes, for a while, meaning five years.

What are the main factors driving U.S. house prices? What could push them up, or cause another slump?

Shiller: The main factor is the world economic crisis and the efforts of governments around the world to stimulate the economy. Parts of those efforts have been directed at the housing market. In the U.S., there is an 8,000 dollar first-time home buyer’s tax credit which expires at the end of November. That’s a reason for concern, as it comes to an end. Also, the Federal Reserve has a plan to buy $1.25 trillion worth of mortgage-backed securities to support the housing market. They are most of the way through the program and anticipate phasing it out at some time in 2010 – that’s another thing that will go away. We’ve yet to see how the housing market will continue. Part of the problem is that people are buying now rather than later. When later comes, there could be a downturn in the market.

Is there an oversupply of houses in the U.S.?

Shiller: That’s been a problem. The inventory of unsold houses has been high, but has come down a bit. On top of that, there will be more foreclosures, more homes are going to be dumped on the market as people default. Now, that may show down as home prices will start going up again. But I suspect that this isn’t going to happen. Also, banks have more REO, or real estate owned, that they’re holding on to for the time being. But eventually those REOs are going to be dumped on the market. So that’s why it doesn’t look particularly encouraging from a supply consideration.

Turning to interest rates, which are at exceptionally low levels: Is there a risk that this eventually will cause irrational exuberance?

Shiller: There is always a risk of that. Those things are hard to predict. However it seems like the present time is least conducive to bubbles of any time. We’re in what some people call “pretend-and-extend” economy, which means that banks that have commercial loans are often extending those loans and pretending that the property is worth something. That’s because they don’t face reality. This kind of economy isn’t really suited to a beginning of a real bubble. Now, everything could change… It’s surprising how strong the residential, single-family home market looks right now. It makes me think that it’s hard to predict animal spirits.

How long can central banks afford to keep expansive policies in place?

Shiller: In principle we can keep this in place for a long time. That’s what Japan did… But confidence is definitely coming back. The depression scare is over at the moment. So it would be plausible that central banks could be raising interest rates — both in the U.S. and Europe — [as early as next year]. But I just have a worry that this isn’t going to happen and that it’s not going to be so easy to extricate [themselves from the low-rate environment].

Will the sharp increase in global debt levels drive up inflation over the medium to long-term?

Shiller: My best guess is that we won’t have inflation, that central banks will pull it back as inflation starts to begin. But I think that there’s a chance of it; people have to be defensive in their investments. It always amazes me that people are so trusting and that they want nominal debt as much as they do… So a good long-term strategy is to invest a good part of one’s portfolio in inflation-indexed bonds, even though it doesn’t particularly look like the time to worry about inflation right now.

FT’s short view explains why Yen is so strong at the moment and whether an intervention is looming.

What to take away is Dollar’s interest rate is so low right now that it is being used as a funding currency for carry trade.

(click to play video; Source: FT)

Bill Gross is buying long-term government treasuries and he expects slower growth and low interest rate in coming years (source: Bloomberg).

Bill Gross, who runs the world’s biggest bond fund at Pacific Investment Management Co., said he’s been buying longer maturity Treasuries in recent weeks as protection against deflation.

“There has been significant flattening on the long end of the curve,” Gross said in an interview from Newport Beach, California, with Bloomberg Radio. “This reflects the re- emergence of deflationary fears. The U.S. is at the center of de-levering as opposed to accelerating growth.”

Gross had said during the midst of the credit crunch that Treasuries offered little value as investors seeking a refuge from turmoil in global financial markets drove yields to record lows in December. He boosted the $177.5 billion Total Return Fund’s investment in government-related bonds to 44 percent of assets, the most since August 2004, from 25 percent in July, according data released earlier this month on Pimco’s Web site. The fund cut mortgage debt to 38 percent from 47 percent.

“We’ve exchanged our mortgages for the government’s check” as the Federal Reserve winds down purchases of agency debt, Gross said today. “Mortgages are expensive compared to Treasuries and other vehicles.”

Fed policy makers last week committed to complete their $1.45 trillion in purchases of mortgage securities and extended the end of the program to March from December.

Policy Reversal

Pimco’s Total Return Fund handed investors a 17.85 percent gain in the past year, beating 94 percent of its peers, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. The one-month return is 1.94 percent, outpacing 57 percent of its competitors. Pimco is a unit of Munich-based insurer Allianz SE.

Pimco in July reversed a policy to steer clear of U.S. debt when it said it would buy five- to 10-year Treasury securities.

“With Treasury yields near the top of our expected range, Pimco plans to overweight duration and take exposure to the five- to 10-year portion of the yield curve,” the firm said July 20 in a report on its Web site.

On that day, the yield on the 10-year note touched an intra-day high of 3.72 percent and a low of 3.57 percent. The note yielded 3.29 percent at 10:36 a.m. today in New York.

Gross said intermediate- to long-term bonds will perform well as long as policy rates and inflation remain low, after minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee’s Aug. 11-12 meeting was released on Sept. 2.

‘New Normal’

Officials at Pimco have forecast a “new normal” in the global economy that will include heightened government regulation, lower consumption and slower growth. The economy will likely expand at a 2 percent to 3 percent rate going forward, Gross said.

The world’s largest economy shrank at a 1.2 percent annual rate from April to June, more than the originally reported 1 percent contraction, according to a Bloomberg News survey before the Commerce Department’s Sept. 30 report. The jobless rate climbed to 9.8 percent this month, from 9.7 percent in August, according to a separate Bloomberg survey before the Labor Department reports figures on Oct. 2.

Michael Mussa is a no-nonsense economist. It’s always good to hear him.

Mussa offers some insights of why he thinks US economy will have a rapid recovery. He expects annual growth rate to be 4.5% and accumulative growth rate from now to the end of 2010 to be 6.8%, both substantially higher than the blue-chip forecast.

Mussa’s forecast largely based on the observation that the sharper the economy falls, the steeper the economy will come back. This statistical behavior of business cycle is shown in the following graph and also documented in my previous post.

Mussa’s forecast still left many questions unanswered: Should we simply rely on a historical statistical pattern to make our economic forecast? We know every recession is different; What if this Great Recession is so different that it will break this historical pattern.

Now I give you Michael Mussa (Source: PIIE, about 30 mins)

Following my last post that looks at the current market rally in historical perspective, here is another update from FT.

Just admit it: most institutional managers simply missed the rally since March. Now in order to keep their jobs or get higher compensation, they have every incentive to get into the market even when the market is already overpriced.

This is one of the main reasons why we had bubbles in the first place: investment managers compete for portfolio performance with their peers — as long as the party is on, they will have to keep dancing.

I am afraid we are likely to head into another asset bubble.

(click to watch; source: FT)