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Too tough to save

Mega banks survived because of government bailout and they are believed to be “too big to fail“.
What about smaller regional banks, with heavy investment in CRE? It seems that they are too tough to save.

Source: WSJ

For the first time in the credit crisis, the government may have run into a problem that is too tough to bail out: commercial real estate.

The Treasury and the Federal Reserve have spent hundreds of billions of dollars shoring up the residential-mortgage market. By comparison, the government’s strategy for dealing with commercial real estate looks slight. And it may have no choice but to step aside and allow an adjustment that could slow the economy and expose banks and bond investors to big losses from the $3.4 trillion outstanding in commercial real-estate debt.

[CREHERD]

Why is this sector so rescue-resistant? First, helping commercial-mortgage holders doesn’t buy votes the way helping homeowners does. Second, look at where commercial real estate lies in the banking sector. In theory, the Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP, should have given banks the capital to absorb loan losses, including those on commercial real-estate debt. TARP injections, along with Fed-run stress tests, helped big banks with more than $100 billion in assets. But those lenders held only 29% of the $1.84 trillion of commercial real-estate debt on bank balance sheets in the second quarter, according to Foresight Analytics.

Yes, smaller banks also tapped TARP, but they weren’t stress-tested in the same way, and thus are less likely to have raised enough equity to deal with commercial real estate. Banks with $1 billion to $10 billion of assets had $450 billion in commercial real-estate exposure in the second quarter, equivalent to more than 330% of Tier 1 capital. For the largest banks, that ratio was 99%, according to Foresight.

Regulators could encourage smaller banks to stock up on capital for a commercial real-estate meltdown. Yet Treasury figures show the number of banks taking TARP capital has dwindled to a trickle.

Regulators appear to be hoping that a partial recovery in commercial real-estate values could reduce the problem. They recently issued guidelines that make it easier to keep underwater loans out of bad-loan tallies, as well as encourage banks to restructure, rather than foreclose on, problem commercial mortgages. Indeed, Foresight estimates that for commercial real-estate bank loans maturing between 2010 and 2014, a 10% rise in values could cut the proportion underwater from 68% to 37%.

But even if prices did rise, banks likely are to want to pare exposure. They have little motivation to refinance commercial real-estate loans.

And investors shouldn’t expect any meaningful revival of the $700 billion market in bonds backed by commercial real-estate loans, even with the Fed providing leverage to buy such securities. While popular during the bubble, these securitizations lack the sort of attributes, like large pools of loans with similar terms, to generate strong demand in saner times, said Joseph Mason of Louisiana State University.

Commercial real estate looks too tough to save.

Bank failures in historical perspective:

(graph courtesy of calculatedrisk)

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Gold rush

Analysis of recent rise of gold price (source: FT)


(click to play the video)

China’s auto industry in consolidation

Shakeout in Chinese auto industry (from WSJ):

BEIJING—Changan Automobile Group Co. on said Tuesday it will take over several automobile companies now owned by state-owned conglomerate Aviation Industry Corp. of China, in a restructuring that could indicate that the consolidation of China's fragmented automobile sector is gaining momentum.

AVIC will get a 23% stake in Changan Automobile in exchange for Harbin HF Automobile Industry Group Co., Jiangxi Changhe Auto Co. and Harbin Dongan Auto Engine Co., as well as Chinese joint ventures with Suzuki Motor Corp. and Mitsubishi Motors Corp., Changan Automobile said in a statement.

Changan Automobile's parent, whose name translates as China Weaponry Equipment Group, will own the remaining 77%, it said.

Changan Automobile is already the parent company of Shenzhen-listed Chongqing Changan Automobile Co.

"This is a very reasonable merger," said Yale Zhang, an analyst at automobile-research firm CSM Worldwide. He said the restructuring helps consolidate China's mini-commercial-vehicle segment, in which Chongqing Changan holds the No. 2 spot by sales volume, followed by Changhe Auto and Harbin HF. The segment is led by SAIC-GM-Wuling Automobile Co., a joint venture between General Motors Co., SAIC Motor Corp. and Wuling Automobile Co.

The restructuring could mean consolidation in China's automobile industry, which the government has been trying to promote, is finally gaining some steam.

China currently has more than 80 automobile makers competing for thin slices of the market.

In May, Guangzhou Automobile Group Co. acquired a 29% stake in Hunan Changfeng Motors Co. to become the sport-utility-vehicle maker's biggest shareholder.

A host of other potential transactions are also under discussion in the industry.

The moves come after the central government said earlier this year it planned to encourage consolidation of its automobilemobile companies into a "big four" and "small four," to increase the local industry's competitiveness against established foreign compeition.

As part of the AVIC deal, Changan Automobile will take over Suzuki's automobile-making joint venture in China with Changhe, Jiangxi Changhe Suzuki Automobile Co., and an engine joint venture between Mitsubishi and Dongan.

The restructured group aims to sell more than 2.6 million vehicles by 2012.

It targets sales of five million vehicles by 2020 and to sell own-brand, high-end vehicles, the statement said.

Is the Fed’s independence under threat?

House panel approved auditing on the Fed (source: WSJ)

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Becker: Will We Go the Way of Japan?

Gary Becker says no, unless US government policies discourage growth

Japan has had a very slow rate of growth in its GDP since 1991, averaging just a little over 1 percent. Given this slow growth, and the government's continued failed efforts to prop up their economy by running large fiscal deficits, the ratio of government debt to its GDP has risen from only about 50% in 1995 to by far the highest ratio in the developed world, at about 170% in 2008. Estimates indicate that it could rise to over 200% by next year as the budget continues to spill red ink, and may grow even much further during the next decade. Such a large debt ratio has been manageable so far only because interest rates have been very low, at about a little over 1%. But these rates have recently been rising as concern is growing about the fiscal solvency of the Japanese government.

The danger of any explicit default on this debt is minimal since it is all denominated in the Japanese currency, the yen. Any country can reduce the real value of a debt burden in its own currency by printing money to finance a good chunk of its government spending, and thereby create inflation that destroys part of the real burden of the debt. I do not expect that to happen in Japan unless the debt burden becomes intolerable down the road.

All this is background for comparisons between Japan and the US. As Posner indicates, the American ratio of debt to GDP is now about 50%, where Japan was in 1995. It is also rising rapidly as the government continues to increase its spending on banks, the stimulus package, likely also on health care, maybe subsidizing employment of the unemployed, subsidizing mortgages, and in many other ways. The ratio of federal government spending to American GDP was quite stable at about 20% for about 40 decades, but this ratio has been rising rapidly during the past year, and it is beginning to approach 30%. The government debt is not yet a great burden because, as in Japan, interest rates are low, so that annual interest payments on the debt is not a sizable fraction of total government spending.

It is unlikely that US government spending will decline during the next decade, even though some of the short term spending on banks and stimulating the economy will probably fall sharply. Any spending declines from these directions will be more than replaced by much greater spending on Medicare, Medicaid, and other government financed health programs, on social security, and on various other entitlement programs. The direct impact on the debt burden of such budget deficits can be reduced only by higher taxes or inflation. Eventually, I do expect much greater inflation in the US. The Obama administration has also been vocal about its plan to raise taxes, especially on higher income persons, as soon as the recession is clearly over and the economy is growing again. That would be a serious mistake.

The best solution to reducing the real burden of the public debt is neither inflation nor higher taxes, but more rapid growth of the American economy. This involves lower, not higher, taxes on investments and incomes of small and large businesses. It also requires greater concern about the fact that the US is falling behind many other countries in the proportion of its young population, especially males, who receive a higher education. In addition, much greater attention needs to be paid to correcting the depressing statistic that the fraction of boys who drop out of high school has been stuck at about 25% for several decades, even though the economic and other benefits of finishing high school and going to college have risen dramatically. To its credit, the Obama administration has given high priority to improving the K-12 performance of American students, especially those from minority backgrounds.

In effect, the desirable policies to stimulate growth involve a retreat from the anti-business rhetoric that pervades Congressional Democrats and some of the top players in the executive offices, and a more pro-consumer and pro-business mentality. It is necessary to maintain the minimalist anti-trust policy that developed during the 1980s and 1990s under Democratic as well as Republican administrations, to retreat from the policy that banks and other businesses, such as GM, cannot be allowed to fail when they are mismanaged.

Desirable policies also include the elimination of efforts to restore union power in the private sector, and resistance to the desires of some members of Congress to have the US retreat from a free trade policy> They also want to impose onerous regulations on businesses of all kinds, especially the more successful ones. I am perhaps particularly disturbed by the anti-immigration rhetoric of leading members of Congress since immigrants have contributed so much to the dynamism of the American economy and society.

Sizable advances in productivity and the resulting sharp economic growth can ease the burden of growing government spending, and prevent anything like the expanding debt to GDP ratio and stagnation of the Japanese economy. Can the US do it? Certainly! Will the US do it? Not with the present composition of Congress, and with the tendency of the President to allow some of the more destructive members of his political party to get their way.

What gold price is telling us

Looking at gold future price, I have become more worried about the US dollar lately. Are we going to have 1971-collapse of US dollar again? The sharp drop of US dollar and China potentially losing a huge chunk of its foreign reserve value remain to be the biggest risk in the system.

Guess I need to be more imaginative in this wildly uncertain world.

(click to enlarge)

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Obama’s town hall meeting in China

China and the US: adversaries or friends?

Unfortunately, Obama’s speech was censored in China.

Compare retail sales in recessions

A very nice chart that puts current retail sales in the historical comparative perspective.


(click to enlarge; graph courtesy of bigpicture)