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Talking about Asia’s consumption

Economist has a good analysis of consumption in Asia during the current crisis and how its quickly rebound means to the rest of the world. One note is that albeit the savings rate is high in Asia, the consumption is not as low as widely reported.

Can Asians replace Americans as a driver of global growth?

ASIA’S emerging economies are bouncing back much more strongly than any others. While America’s industrial production continued to slide in May, output in emerging Asia has regained its pre-crisis level (see chart 1). This is largely due to China; but although production in the region’s smaller economies is still well down on a year ago, it is rebounding in those countries too. Taiwan’s industrial output rose by an annualised 80% in the three months to May compared with the previous three months. JPMorgan estimates that emerging Asia’s GDP has grown by an annualised 7% in the second quarter.

Asia’s ability to decouple from America reflects the fact that the region’s downturn was caused only partly by the slump in American activity. In most Asian economies falling domestic demand was more important than the drop in net exports in explaining the collapse in GDP growth. The surge in food and energy prices in the first half of 2008 squeezed profits and spending power. Tighter monetary policy aimed at curbing inflation then further choked domestic demand.

The recent recovery in industrial production reflects the end of destocking by manufacturers as well as the large fiscal stimulus by most governments. But the boost from both of these factors will fade. Meanwhile, export markets in developed economies are likely to remain weak. So the recovery in Asian economies will stumble unless domestic spending, notably consumption, perks up.

Consumers’ appetite to spend varies hugely across the region. In China, India and Indonesia spending has increased by annual rates of more than 5% during the global downturn. China’s retail sales have soared by 15% over the past year. This overstates the true growth rate because it includes government purchases, but official household surveys suggest that real spending is growing at a still-impressive rate of 9%. In the year to May, sales of household electronics were up by 12%, clothing by 22% and cars by a stunning 47%.

Elsewhere in the region, spending has stumbled, squeezed by higher unemployment and lower wages. In Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea real consumer spending was 4-5% lower in the first quarter than a year earlier, a much bigger drop than in America. But Frederic Neumann, an economist at HSBC, sees tentative signs that spending is picking up. Taiwan’s retail sales rose in May for the third consecutive month. Department-store sales in South Korea rose by 5% in the year to May.

It is often argued that emerging Asian economies have large current-account surpluses—and are thus not pulling their fair weight in the world—because consumers like to save rather than spend. Yet this does not really fit the facts. During the past five years consumer spending in emerging Asia has grown by an annual average of 6.5%, much faster than in any other part of the world. It is true that consumption has fallen as a share of GDP, but that is because investment and exports have grown even faster, not because spending has been weak. Relative to American consumer spending, Asian consumption has soared (see chart 2).

In most Asian economies, private consumption is 50-60% of GDP, which is not out of line with rates in countries at similar levels of income elsewhere. China, however, is an exception. Private consumption there fell from 46% of GDP in 2000 to only 35% last year—half that in America. In dollar terms, spending is only one-sixth of that in America. (Singapore’s consumption is also low, at just under 40% of GDP.)

This explains why China’s government has recently taken bolder action than others to boost consumption. Over the past six months the government in Beijing has introduced a host of incentives to encourage households to open their wallets. Rural residents get subsidies for buying vehicles and other goods such as televisions, refrigerators, computers and mobile phones; urban residents get a subsidy if they trade in cars and home appliances for new goods; tax rates on low-emission cars have also been cut. There is huge potential for higher consumption in the countryside as incomes rise: only 30% of rural households have a refrigerator, for example, compared with virtually all urban households.

The government has also introduced several measures this year to improve the social safety net, such as spending more on health care, pensions and payments to low-income households. On June 19th it ordered all state-owned firms that had listed on the stockmarket since 2005 to transfer 10% of their shares to the National Social Security Fund to shore up its assets. The short-term impact is likely to be modest but if such measures ease households’ worries about future pensions and health care, it could in the long term encourage them to save less and spend more.

Another way to boost consumption is to make it easier to borrow. In most Asian economies household debt is less than 50% of GDP, compared with around 100% in many developed economies; in China and India it is less than 15%. South Korea is the big exception: households have as much debt relative to their income as Americans and their saving rate has fallen over the past decade from 18% of disposable income to only 4%. In many other Asian economies financing for consumer durables is virtually nonexistent. Promisingly, the Chinese bank regulator announced draft rules in May to allow domestic and foreign institutions to set up consumer-finance firms to offer personal loans for consumer-goods purchases.

These measures are a modest step in the right direction. But a bigger test of Asian governments’ resolve to shift the balance of growth from exports towards domestic spending is whether they will allow their exchange rates to rise. A revaluation would lift consumers’ real purchasing power and give firms reason to shift resources towards producing for the domestic market. But so far, policymakers have been reluctant to let currencies rise too fast.

Asian spending is already an important engine of global growth. Even before the crisis, emerging Asia’s consumer spending contributed slightly more (in absolute dollar terms) to the growth in global demand than did America’s. But it could be even bigger if Asians enjoyed the full fruits of their hard labour, rather than subsidising Western consumers through undervalued currencies. It is time for an even greater shift in spending power from the West to the East.

Yuan’s internationlization: limited so far

China has a long way to go to internationalize its currency, Yuan. For one, China does not have a foreign exchange market for Yuan outside China and this would be troublesome for its trading partners to manage currency risk. Also, China's Yuan is tied to the US dollar. It can hardly offer any more stability than the US dollar.  Here is a short analysis from WSJ.

If the dollar's role in the global economy is under a cloud, the yuan isn't the cause. At least not yet.

China this week began allowing trade between companies in five Chinese cities and Hong Kong, Macau, and the ASEAN member countries, to be settled in yuan.

Starting just days before a G-8 summit at which the dollar's status could be a hot topic, the trade settlement moves are China's most tangible step toward promoting the international use of its own currency.

[yuan]

In reality, Beijing may find that its remit to mold market forces doesn't extend much beyond its own borders.

China certainly has some good reasons to invoice trade in yuan, not least as a way to slow the growth of its $2 trillion in foreign exchange reserves.

But for the practice to take off, key counterparties outside China must be willing to buy and sell using yuan. This is where the plan runs into hurdles.

Some trading partners may find they have no choice — like those buying high-end machinery for which China's prices are so competitive it's in a position to dictate the settlement currency.

But with China's capital markets off limits to foreigners, firms dealing in yuan can only deposit funds in low yielding accounts in Hong Kong. The yuan isn't traded outside of China so companies won't have a way to manage their foreign exchange risk.

Beijing counters this limitation by trumpeting the yuan's stability. Given the currency's effective peg to the dollar for nearly a year now, it actually offers no more stability than the greenback — the currency it would seek to replace — something that won't offer much encouragement to Malaysian or Thai exporters, for example.

Certainly, being able to tap China's flush banks for trade financing is a draw but there's always the risk that avenue may dry up if Beijing tightens credit as it has in the past.

In truth, appreciation, rather than stability, is the yuan's only draw. China's currency regulator said as much in a recently published report, arguing that a rising currency is a prerequisite for yuan settlement.

These days, given the ongoing slump in Chinese exports, that's hardly worth betting on.

Inflation or deflation?

The debate is still going on:

Understand labor market dynamics

What we will be witnessing may well be another jobless recovery, just like after 1991 and 2001 recessions.

With working hours of full-time workers being cut (see chart 1 below), and a lot of people on part-time-job roll (chart 2), when true economic recovery comes, employers will first increase working hours of existing full-time workers, then transfer people from part-time roll back into full-time. This means any new hiring will come very late and slow…maybe years after official recession ends. Measure of broader unemployment rate, including drop of part-time workers from full-time labor force, in fact now already reached over 16% (chart 3).

Chart 1.

(click to enlarge; graph courtesy of calculatedrisk)

Chart 2.


(click to enlarge; graph courtesy of calculatedrisk)

Chart 3.


(click to enlarge)

Here below is an analytic piece from WSJ yesterday on the same topic:

Jobs Data Mow Down ‘Green Shoots’

June’s payrolls numbers contradict the “green-shoots” thesis. Worse, the data suggest that when they do appear, they won’t exactly shoot up.

Since the U.S. officially entered recession in December 2007, 6.9 million jobs have been lost, on a seasonally adjusted basis. More bad news lies beneath Thursday’s headline numbers. The average workweek fell to 33 hours, the lowest ever on record and 0.8 hours less than before the recession began.

If Americans still were clocking those extra 48 minutes a week now, then the same aggregate amount of work could get done with 3.3 million fewer employees. The implication is that, were it not for shorter workweeks, the unemployment rate would be 11.7%, not the official 9.5%.

Stealth underemployment also is evident in the rise in the number of workers taking part-time jobs due to the slack economy. Their ranks have doubled in this recession, to about nine million, or 5.8% of the work force.

The likelihood is that when economic activity picks up, employers will choose to increase hours on existing workers and bring back part-time workers to full-time status before making new hires.

That sets up a recovery that could rival the previous upswing in terms of joblessness. The difference between any coming upturn and the one that ended in December 2007 is that struggling workers will have less credit available to maintain spending habits. Paradoxically, labor’s woes likely will enable many firms to beat near-term earnings expectations, as wage costs dwindle or stagnate. But the unavoidable conclusion is that the consumer-spending power needed to fuel a sharp rebound in the economy just isn’t there.

China’s strategic commodities buildup

I have voiced caution in using commodity prices, especially copper, as leading economic indicator. With new data coming out of China, it looks like China has been strategically building up commodities inventory and a good part of Chinese recovery story as reflected by commodities prices may have gone a bit too far.

The below chart from BoFIT looks at China’s crude and iron ore imports, at a 3-month moving average, dating back to 2001. The recent sharp jump at both imports can’t even be justified during normal economic times, let alone we are in the deepest recession since WWII.

There is only one explanation: China is buying commodities on the cheap.

More analysis from BoFIT:

China’s appetite for commodities driven by desire to build up inventories. Although the volume of Chinese imports overall is still down 6 % from last year (and down 25 % in value terms), import volumes have rebounded sharply in recent months due largely to a massive increase in commodity imports. Crude oil import volumes now exceed last year’s level and iron ore imports are up about a third from last year (see chart). Imports of pure aluminium and copper have skyrocketed from previous years.

The growth in imports of metallic ores and refined metals has been driven in part from of a revival in construction activity as a result of the government’s stimulus package. Increased construction, in turn, has helped steelmakers recover from last year’s production collapse. Carmakers are also driving metal demand. In May, China produced about 600,000 passenger cars, a third more than in May 2008.

Higher output, however, does not fully explain the increase. Companies appear to be taking advantage of a slump in global commodity prices to replenish depleted raw material inventories; energy prices are about half of last year’s peak and metal prices are off 40 % from their recent highs. There is also evidence that certain commodities are cheaper abroad right now than in China. For example, China’s own iron ore production is still well below the level of a year ago.

China’s building up of strategic commodity reserves is affecting global demand for crude oil and metals. Its recent aggressive purchasing of pure aluminium and copper may be related to the build up.

Grim employment picture

June unemployment rate increased to 9.5%. In my mind, the UR is sure to pass 10%. So where do we stand now? Look at the below chart to get some historical perspective.

(click to enlarge; graph courtesy of calculatedrisk)

Also, watch this analysis from FT:


(click on the graph to play; source: FT)

A 100-year history of housing prices

A history of housing prices dating back to 1890.


(click to enlarge; graph courtesy of Steve Barry)

Compared to the housing boom after WWII, the fundamental difference is we are now facing an aging population (mostly baby boomers); demand is lacking to absorb the huge inventory buildup during the bubble. As a result, the housing prices will be more likely to fall, down to the level before the bubble, rather than staying at a higher level.

John Taylor vs. Paul Krugman

A debate (I rather call it a clash) between ‘conservative’ John Taylor and ‘liberal’ Paul Krugman. Taylor is the ‘inventor’ of the famous Taylor Rule in monetary policy and now teaches at Stanford University. Krugman teaches at Princeton and recently won Nobel prize in economics of 2008.